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Immigration to Korea: A Fiscal Boon or Burden?† 
By JINWOOK HUR* 
This paper intends to examine the extent of the fiscal contribution of 
immigrants to Korea. According to this analysis, the aim is to derive 
implications pertaining to the direction of Korea’s immigration policy 
as a response to fiscal problems caused by population aging. For this 
purpose, a macroeconomic model is designed to measure the lifetime 
net fiscal contribution of immigrants in Korea by visa type, age, and 
other characteristics. According to this analysis, the sum of the lifetime 
fiscal contribution for all immigrants in Korea is negative. This implies 
that immigration policy reforms that increase the inflow size while 
maintaining the current structure of the foreign population 
characteristics can rather worsen Korea’s fiscal problems. This finding 
suggests that immigration policy reform may exacerbate Korea’s fiscal 
soundness if it simply targets the maintenance of the numerical balance 
of the demographic structure. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
t is well known that Korea is one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. The 
working-age population (15~64) has been in decline since 2017, and the overall 
population is expected to start declining in 2029 (Statistics Korea, 2019). Korea is still a 
younger country than most developed economies, such as those in Western Europe and 
Japan, but the speed of aging is expected to be far higher than in those countries. With 
this rapid population aging, the major problems already experienced by developed 
economies, such as problems with fiscal sustainability, can also occur in Korea, but more 
severely. 
As these population imbalances and related problems have emerged as a major 
issue during the establishment of policy directions in Korea, various alternatives are 
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being discussed. One of these alternatives is a change to Korea’s immigration policy 
so that Korea will allow more immigrants. While allowing immigrants into Korea 
has thus far mainly been thought of as a means by which to meet labor demands, the 
recent idea of an expansionary immigration policy considers immigration as a tool 
to mitigate the speed of population aging. In particular, mitigating problems such as 
low growth and the fiscal imbalance caused by the decline of the working-age 
population by allowing working-age immigrants who can engage in economic 
activities in Korea has been argued. 
Indeed, it is not a new phenomenon from a global perspective that the expansion 
of immigration policy is mentioned as an alternative to aging. Some European 
countries, such as Germany and Sweden, which experienced slowing population 
growth caused by aging prior to Korea, have implemented active population inflow 
policies with the aim of securing labor and improving fiscal soundness. Even in other 
advanced economies, it is reported that countries with severe population aging tend 
to have a high proportion of immigrants to the native population.1 Therefore, for the 
U.S. and the major European countries, the socio-economic effects of an influx of 
immigrants have been studied from various perspectives, as the movement of 
populations among those countries has been more active for more time compared to 
population movements in Korea. On the other hand, in Korea, it has not been as long 
since such discussions actively began. Although the number of foreigners residing in 
Korea is increasing rapidly, statistical data related to them have not been sufficiently 
accumulated quantitatively or qualitatively; accordingly, research to derive policy 
implications through rigorous empirical analyses remains as a future task. 
However, despite the limited availability of data, analyzing the economic effects 
of immigration inflows is essential when setting immigration policies to respond to 
population aging. The main problem of aging is not simply stagnant or declining 
populations but rather a problem arising from the decrease in the relative size of the 
working-age population relative to the dependent population due to aging. In other 
words, a major policy consideration is whether various fiscal systems such as welfare 
systems can be sustained even during a population imbalance. Therefore, predicting 
how immigration policies can solve the problem of a population imbalance from an 
economic perspective using available statistics must be done prior to actual policy 
making activities. In this sense, it is an important task to predict the fiscal impact of 
immigrants using quantitative economic models. 
For this purpose, this study aims to examine the main characteristics of foreigners 
residing in Korea based on available statistical data and then to quantitatively 
measure their impact on the government’s fiscal soundness in Korea. Specifically, 
the main content of this study involves a measurement of how much immigrants will 
contribute through tax and fee payments relative to the amount of government 
expenditure caused by them, depending on their main characteristics, specifically 
their visa type, gender, and age. In particular, by estimating how the fiscal 
contribution of immigrants differs according to the visa type held, this study attempts 
to derive implications for current foreigner policies in Korea, especially visa 
issuance policies. 
This study is related to the literature on the fiscal impact of immigrants to the host 
 
1Lee et al. (2015).  
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country. First, in a study of the U.S. economy, Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) 
estimated the fiscal effect of an influx of immigrants on the U.S. economy, arguing 
that if immigrants are strictly limited to young and highly skilled workers, the fiscal 
burden can be partially mitigated, whereas the overall fiscal effect appears to be 
insignificant. Lee and Miller (2000) also draw similar conclusions using models that 
more realistically reflect the population sector. On the other hand, Storesletten (2000) 
analyzes the fiscal effect of an immigration inflow using a general equilibrium model 
reflecting the productivity effect on the supply side due to the immigration inflow. 
In this analysis, he argues that allowing 1.6 million highly skilled immigrants aged 
40-44 into the U.S. economy every year can maintain the fiscal sustainability of the 
U.S. government even without tax reforms. Among studies focusing on European 
cases, Storesletten (2003) examines the fiscal impact of immigrants entering Sweden 
using Swedish data. In that case, it was found that immigrants aged approximately 
20 to 35 make a positive contribution to the fiscal soundness of Sweden, whereas 
immigrants of other ages have a negative impact considering that government 
expenditures related to this group exceeds their lifetime taxes and fees. In other 
words, he claims that the ages of immigrants have a considerable influence on their 
degree of fiscal contribution. Schou (2006) presents the results of an analysis of the 
CGE model using Danish data, showing that the average immigrant imposes a 
greater fiscal burden compared to their fiscal contribution. Rowthorn (2008) 
conducts an empirical analysis of immigrants in major European countries and shows 
that the net contribution of immigrants to the host country’s fiscal status as a whole 
is positive but negligibly small. On the one hand, Imrohoroglu et al. (2017) argues 
that increasing short-term foreign workers (guest workers) is a reasonable policy 
alternative to Japan’s rapidly aging and declining working-age population using a 
general equilibrium model analysis. In their study, they argue that Japan’s fiscal 
problem can be partly solved by allowing more guest workers even if all of the 
immigrant workers are low-skilled workers. 
With regard to studies of the Korean economy, few explicitly analyze the fiscal 
contributions of immigrants. One of these with theme similar to this is that of Chun 
(2012), which focuses on how the influx of immigration affects overall productivity 
in Korea. He shows that the inflow of immigrants can increase the per-capita GDP if 
their productivity is high enough and public expenditures on them are not 
excessively large. Lee et al. (2009) analyzes the effect of an influx of immigrants on 
the population structure of Korea, concluding that if multicultural families increase, 
their high fertility rates can substantially alleviate the population imbalance and 
decline in the working-age population otherwise occurring due to aging in Korea. 
This study aims to estimate the fiscal impact of immigrants entering Korea 
according to visa type, gender, and age, referring to the earlier studies mentioned 
above. The model for the analysis basically stems from the partial equilibrium model 
used in existing articles but is modified and extended to reflect the actual Korean 
economy. For the sectors related to household consumption and the labor market in 
the model, the method of Storesletten (2003) is applied, in which consumption, 
savings, and labor input are determined in the form of behavioral equations instead 
of solutions to the optimization problem. However, his model is modified and 
extended for the government sector and the immigration policy sector so that it can 
reflect the reality of Korea to the greatest extent possible. In particular, the national 
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pension, government consumption and transfers are modeled to better suit the 
Korean system. 
Moreover, one of the expected contributions of this study to the literature is that 
the model actually reflects a visa issuance policy suitable for the reality of Korea. In 
many existing partial equilibrium estimation models, it is often assumed that all 
immigrants stay without leaving the host country for their lifetime once they enter, 
while the model used in this study distinguishes major visa types and derives a 
solution using not only age and gender but also the immigrants’ visa types. 
Therefore, the method of this study is specialized in deriving implications for 
immigration policy – i.e., the visa type to be issued. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The immigration policy and visa types 
existing in Korea are introduced in Section II. The model setup is demonstrated in 
Section III, and the calibration strategy is explained in Section IV. After describing 
the results of the analysis in Section V, Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. Immigration Policy and Major Visa Types of Korea 
  
Before explaining the model analysis, this section briefly introduces Korea’s 
major visa types. First, the paper discusses how visa types are classified. Based on 
this, one of the main data sources used in this study, the Survey on Immigrant’s Living 
Conditions and Labour by Statistics Korea, is discussed. 
The main purpose of this study is firstly to estimate the fiscal contribution of 
foreigners who stay in Korea for a reasonably long time. Accordingly, foreigners 
entering Korea with a visa for less than one year are excluded from the analysis, and 
the subject of the analysis is limited to those with a visa that allows a stay of one 
year or more. Those foreigners (with a visa for one year or more) are defined as 
“immigrants” in this study.2 There can be several ways to classify immigrants, but 
in this paper, the methods of Lee and Nho (2013)3 are applied. Table 1 classifies the 
types of immigrants into those present for short-term work purposes, long-term work 
purposes, family purposes, and long-term residence purposes. 
Each category of Table 1 is described as follows. First, the short-term work 
purpose type consists of visas such as those for students (D-2, D-4-1, and D-4-7), 
non-professional employment (E-9), and work visits (H-2). The non-professional 
(E-9) types are for foreigners entering Korea under the employment permit system, 
and the government decides on the number of these according to the industry based 
on the demands of companies that want to hire foreign workers. Regarding work 
visitors (H-2), the government also determines the number of visas issued from 
compatriots in China and countries of the former Soviet Union. In other words, the 
numbers of both E-9 and H-2 visas issued are controlled by the Korean government. 
They are termed “short-term” in the sense that their period of stay is limited, and 
 
2The Statistics Division of the United Nations defines “international long-term immigrants” as those who live 
in a country other than their main residence for more than 12 months, and “international short-term immigrants” as 
those staying for 3~12 months. This paper refers to foreigners residing in Korea who plan to remain for one year or 
more as “immigrants.” 
3Lee and Nho (2013) classify Korean visa types in accordance with OECD standards. Lee et al. (2014) analyzes 
the statuses of foreigners’ entering and leaving according to this classification. 
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TABLE 1— CATEGORIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS 
Purposes Years of Stay Visas in Each Category 
Short-term  
Work Purpose 
1~5 years Non-professional Employment (E-9), Work Visit (H-2) 
Long-term  
Work Purpose 
5 years + 
Professorship (E-1), Foreign Language Instructor (E-2), Research 
(E-3), Technology Transfer (E-4), Professional Employment (E-5), 
Arts and Performances (E-6), Special Occupations (E-7) 
Family Purpose 5 years + 
Family Visitation (F-1), Residency (F-2), Dependent Family (F-3), 
Marriage Migrant (F-6) 
Long-term 
Residence Purpose 
5 years + Overseas Koreans (F-4), Permanent Residency (F-5) 
Source: Lee and Nho (2013) and Lee et al. (2014) modified by the author. 
 
once the period of stay is over, they must go through a procedure for re-qualification 
from the beginning.4 
In contrast, regarding the other types (long-term work purposes, family purposes, 
and long-term residence purposes), extension of the visa is free or only slightly 
limited. While the aforementioned non-professional employment or work visit adopt 
a limited length of stay to prevent settlement, the visas in the other categories are 
relatively flexible in allowing an extension. The long-term work purpose visas are 
mainly called “professional staff” (E-1~E-7 visas), as they consist of visas for cases 
such as professorships, research, and conversational instruction. The family purpose 
type consists of residential (F-2), family visitation (F-1), and marriage migrant (F-2-
1, F-6) visas. 
Table 2 shows the amounts of immigrants staying by visa type as of the end of 
2016. It can be observed that non-professionals, work visitors, overseas Koreans, 
and marriage migrants account for a high proportion, whereas the number of 
professional staff visas is relatively small. 
The most important data source used in this study to examine how the fiscal 
contribution of immigrants differs in terms of visa type, gender, and age is the 
“Survey on Immigrant’s Living Conditions and Labour Force.” This survey extracts 
samples from all registered foreigners in Korea and categorizes them according to 
eight visa types – non-professional employment (E-9), work visits (H-2), 
professional staff (E-1~E-7), students (D-2, D-4-1, D-4-7), overseas Koreans (F-4), 
permanent residents (F-5), marriage migrants (F-6, F-2-1), and others (See Figure 
1). The survey includes gender, age, period of stay in Korea, average monthly 
income, labor force participation, employment, and other measures. Therefore, the 
actual model analysis is conducted according to the classification of visa type in the 
“Survey on Immigrant’s Living Conditions and Labour Force,” considering data 
availability. Student visas (D-2, D-4-1, and D-4-7) are excluded from this study 
because students do not generally work and thus do not fit the purpose of this study. 
Regarding this survey data, it is not possible to know which visas comprise the 
“Other” status, but compared to the number of foreigners staying by visa type 
 
4For both the non-professional employment (E-9) and work visit (H-2) types, the period of stay is limited to 3 
years, but one extension is possible for one year and ten months. In other words, the allowed stay duration is 
practically four years and ten months. After this period, one must go through the process of a qualification review 
from the beginning for re-qualification. 
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TABLE 2— SCALE OF IMMIGRANTS BY PURPOSE OF STAY AND VISA TYPE (2016) 
Purpose of Stay Visa 
Number of 
Immigrants
Ratio to the Whole 
Immigrants with 1 
year+ Stay (%) 





Non-Professional (E-9) 279,187 18.81 13.62 





Professorship (E-1) 2,511 0.17 0.12 
Foreign Language Instructor (E-2) 15,450 1.04 0.75 
Research (E-3) 3,174 0.21 0.15 
Technology Transfer (E-4) 187 0.01 0.01 
Professional Employment (E-5) 618 0.04 0.03 
Arts and Performances (E-6) 4,302 0.29 0.21 
Special Occupation (E-7) 21,498 1.45 1.05 
Family Purpose 
Family Visitation (F-1) 103,826 6.99 5.07 
Residency (F-2) 36,179 2.44 1.77 
Dependent Family (F-3) 22,828 1.54 1.11 
Marriage Migrant (F-6) 152,231 10.26 7.43 
Long-term 
Residence Purpose 
Overseas Korean (F-4) 372,533 25.10 18.18 
Permanent Residency (F-5) 102,840 6.93 5.02 
Note: The sum of ratios to the immigrants with 1 year+ stay is not 100% since the table discards students and 
marriage naturalization. The total number of immigrants with 1 year+ stay equals 1,484,315, and the number of total 
foreigners equals 2,049,441. 
Source: Ministry of Justice, “Korean Immigration Service Statistics,” 2016. 
  
 
FIGURE 1. QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE SURVEY – VISA TYPE 
 
provided by the Ministry of Justice, approximately 72% of foreigners who responded 




The major goal of the model is to derive fiscal implications of the immigration 
influx by computing immigrants’ fiscal contributions and fiscal costs. A partial 
equilibrium model is used for the model analysis. Although a partial equilibrium 
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model does not consider behavioral changes of agents in the markets, it more readily 
reflects the heterogeneity of agents and maps complex fiscal institution in the real 
world into the model. Therefore, this study relies on the partial equilibrium setting, 
in which the only equilibrium condition is the government’s long-run budget 
constraint. 
Essentially, the details of the model are similar to those in Storesletten (2003), but 
the model of this paper better reflects Korea’s reality. For instance, the model 
considers return migration of guest workers, while Storesletten (2003) assumes that 
all immigrants stay in the host country for life. 
The model has dynamic overlapping generation properties. Total population is 
divided into natives and different types of immigrants, and they earn income by 
supplying labor. A certain portion of the income is taxed, and each agent then decides 
how much to consume and save. The government spends tax revenue on various 
types of government consumption, transfers, pension payments, and other purposes. 
The details of the model are described below. 
 
A. Demographic Structure 
 
Total population consists of natives and the immigrant populations holding seven 
different types of visas. Each person has a gender (either male or female) and age 
(from 0 to 99). A newborn child is assumed to be zero years old and can live only up 
to 99 years old. In the model, one period corresponds to one year; therefore, each 
agent can survive for up to 100 periods. 
Agents are distinguished by only five variables – age, gender, labor market 
participation, visa type, and age at the time of immigration. It is assumed that two 
agents are perfectly identical if those five types are also identical. For brevity, a five-
dimensional type vector ( ,i s  ) is used, in which i   stands for age, and 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )s s s s s  for (gender, labor market participation, visa type, age at the time 
of immigration), respectively. The range of values that each subtype can have is 
shown in Table 3. Theoretically, the number of types can be as high as 
100 2 2 8 100 320,000     . 
First, we discuss assumptions pertaining to the duration of stays for foreigners. In 
actuality, E-9 (the non-professionals) and H-2 (work visitors) holders are allowed to 
stay in Korea for up to four years and ten months. In this study, it is assumed that all 
H-2 and E-9 holders (if they do not die before their visa expires) return to their home 
country after exactly five years. In other words, the possibility of return migration to 
the home country is excluded before five years. On the other hand, immigrants with 
other types of visas (professional staff, marriage migrants, overseas Koreans, 
permanent residents, and others) are assumed to stay in Korea for their lifetime and 
never to return to their home countries. 
Next, we discuss assumptions about fertility for each type. In reality, it is expected 
that visa holders for five years or less (such as H-2 and E-9 holders) have very low 
fertility rates in Korea. In the model, for simplicity it is assumed that the foreigners 
with these two types of visas do not give birth at all in Korea, and only foreigners 
with other types of visas (professional staff, marriage migrants, overseas Koreans, 
permanent resident, and others) are assumed able to give birth in Korea. Additionally, 
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TABLE 3— TYPES OF THE AGENTS IN THE MODEL 
Types Meaning Number of Cases Note 
 Age 100 an integer for 0~99 




2 {participants, non-participants} 
 Visa Type 8 
{native, non-professional, work visit, professional, marriage 
migrant, overseas Korean, permanent resident, other} 
 
Age at the Time 
of Immigration 
100 An Integer for 0~99 
 
TABLE 4— ASSUMPTIONS ON FERTILITY AND DURATION OF STAY IN THE MODEL ECONOMY 
Visa Types Able to Give Birth in Korea Duration of Stay in Korea 
Native O 0 Years Old to Death 
Non-professional 
X 
5 Years after Entrance, or Death 
(Death Can Come Earlier than 5 Years) Work Visit 
Professional 






every child born in Korea is assumed to be a native Korean, even if any of her parents 
is a foreigner. 
Finally, it is assumed that all agents of a certain type have an identical stream of 
survival rate by age. The unconditional probability that a type s  agent survives at 
age i  is denoted by 
,i s




   for all s  , and the conditional 
probability that an agent alive at age i  is alive at age i j  equals 
, ,
/
i j s i s
  . 
 
B. Labor Market 
 
The labor market is drastically simplified in order for the model to concentrate on 
fiscal implications. First, those 19~64 years of age are considered to be of working 
age. Agents under 19 or over 65 years old are assumed not to work at all. The 
working-age population consists of labor force participants and non-labor force 
participants, and the labor force participants are either employed or unemployed. For 
the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that all agents are divided into labor force or 
non-labor force participants with a certain probability at the age of 20 and that this 
status is maintained for their lifetimes thereafter. Moreover, in determination of those 
employed or unemployed, it is assumed that a predetermined unemployment rate 
,i s




u  of a period and are unemployed for the remaining 
,i s
u  of the period. This 
simplification intends to resolve the complexity of the computation caused by 
heterogeneity of the work status within the same type.  
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The pre-tax wage of each type of labor force participant depends on the type-
specific labor productivity and the duration of employment described above. This is 
expressed as follows:  
 
(Labor income of a type ( ,i s ) at period t )
, ,
(1 )
t i s i s
W e u     
Here, 
t
W  refers to the wage per efficiency unit of labor, which is identical for 
workers of all types, and 
,i s
e  is a parameter representing the productivity of each 
type. A worker can earn more labor income by working for the same time if he has a 
higher 
,i s
e , implying that there is a wage gap caused by differences in productivity 




e   
is assumed; that is, no labor income is earned. Moreover, 
t
W  grows for every 
period at a rate of z . In other words, the wage per efficiency unit of labor in period 




W z W  . This model setup intends to exclude supply-
side factors in the usual general equilibrium models by assuming that labor 
productivity is homogeneous among the agents of the same type. Also, it does not 
take into account the potential effect on wages or unemployment that the influx of 
immigrants may cause. In fact, there has long been debate among economists on 
whether an influx of immigrants can increase the unemployment rate or decrease the 
wages of existing native workers, but it appears that recent empirical works tend to 
find no significant effect.5 Therefore, the assumption pertaining to the labor market 




The government spends its budget on government consumption, transfers, health 
insurance benefits, and national pension benefits. The government finances its 




Taxation is assumed to have a simple form. The tax system consists of 
consumption taxes and income taxes (including social insurance contributions). Each 
of these taxes is considered a proportional tax with a single tax rate. All agents pay 
c
  of their own consumption and 
1
  of their own income. 
This simplified tax system considering only the two average tax rates in this model 
is used because it is necessary to estimate the taxpayer’s income distribution in order 
meaningfully to reflect the progressive tax system that most closely approximates 
 
5Peri (2014) surveys 270 analyses from 27 of the latest papers that empirically analyze the effects of an influx 
of immigrants on the wage levels of native workers for different countries, regions, and methods, finding that more 
than 75% of the studies conclude that the elasticity of the immigration influx is between -0.2 and 0.2, i.e., close to 
zero. In addition, the remaining 25% of the studies conclude that the effect of immigrants on the wages of the natives 
is positive. In particular, most studies of the short-term effects of immigration find that the effects of immigration 
are close to zero, whereas studies of long-term effects find that the estimated effects of immigration are positive. 
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reality. However, there is not a sufficiently good data source by which to measure 
the income distribution of immigrants to Korea. Although the average monthly salary 
of foreign workers is surveyed by the Survey on Immigrants Living Conditions and 
Labour Force of Statistics Korea, it is difficult to maintain the significance of the 
results, as the sample size is very small if classified according to visa type or age. 
Moreover, the monthly salary data are represented only in a wide range, making it 
difficult meaningfully to estimate the income distribution of immigrants.6 Therefore, 
in this study, only a simple tax system with a single tax rate for both income and 




Government consumption consists of a variety of subcategories, some of which 
are used intensively for specific types of agents (e.g., education, health), while others 
are utilized on the population as a whole (e.g., defense, SOC). Considering these 
points, in the model it is assumed that the amount of government consumption per 
agent can differ for each type. For the initial period ( 0t   ), the amount of 
government consumption per agent with type ( ,i s  ) is denoted as 
,i s
g  , and the 
measure of population with type ( ,i s ) at period t  is denoted as 
, ,i s t
 . It is also 
assumed that the per-capita government consumption increases at a rate identical to 
that of the average wage mentioned above. As a result, the total government 





t i s i s t
i s
G z g     
Transfers 
 
Transfer payments are divided into welfare expenditures (
,i s
b ) and work-related 
expenditures, and work-related expenditures are again divided into unemployment 
benefits (
,i s
ub ) and industrial accident compensation (
,i s
ia ). Welfare expenditure is 
divided into expenditures for specific types and spending for the entire economy in 
a manner similar to the above-mentioned government consumption. All components 






ia ) are assumed to grow at a rate of z  every 
period; this rate is identical to the growth rate of wages. 
It is assumed that welfare expenditures are transferred to the beneficiary at a fixed 
amount, while work-related expenditures are paid in proportion to the productivity 
of the beneficiary. Unemployment benefits (
,i s
b ) are also assumed to be distributed 
to labor force participants during unemployment periods, and industrial accident 
compensation (
,i s
ia ) is distributed to the labor force participants during employment 
periods. As a result, welfare expenditures, unemployment benefits, and industrial 
 
6The total amount of monthly income of foreigners surveyed is listed in only four categories: “less than 1 
million won,” “1 million to 2 million won,” “2 million to 3 million won,” and “more than 3 million won.” 
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accident compensation per capita for each type are summarized below. 
 
(Welfare expenditure per capita in type ,i s )
,i s
b  
(Unemployment benefit per capita in type ,i s )
, , ,i s i s i s
u e ub  
(Industrial accident comp. per capita in type ,i s )
, , ,
(1 )
i s i s i s
u e ia   
 
Health Insurance and National Pension 
 
National health insurance is assumed to be subscribed to by all agents, including 
immigrants, while the national pension is subscribed to only by labor force 
participants. The volume of health insurance benefits (
,i s
hc ) differs according to the 
type of beneficiary depending here on their age, gender, visa status, and other factors 
and does not rely on the timing of work entrance or work status. The national pension 
benefit (
,i s
pen ) is basically paid to retirees aged 65 years or older in the model and 
depends on the recipient’s labor income while she was working when young (termed 
the “-value”) and the average total income of all subscribers (“-value”) such that 





pen ) also grow at a rate of z , as does the wage rate. Details of 
the calculation method are described in the next section on the calibration of the model. 
 
D. Private Consumption 
 
All agents, including natives and immigrants, spend all of their disposable income 
on consumption during their lifetimes. Newborn children begin their life without any 
initial assets. With regard to immigrants, the possibility of immigration with some 
assets is considered, but it is assumed that the income immigrants earned before their 
migration is exactly equal to the income that would have been obtained if they had 
done business in the host country. 
Assuming a constant relative risk aversion, a constant interest rate and a constant 
growth rate, the propensity to consume for each period is determined only by age but 
not by the timing of consumption. Therefore, the propensity to consume 







 without the time subscript. 
The consumption function of the initial period ( 0t  ) can then be expressed as the 
portion corresponding to the propensity to consume among the present value of 





, 1 0 , , , , , , ,
0
(1 ) [{(1 ) }(1 ) ]
1
i s
i s j j
j s j s j s j s j s j s i s j s
jc
c











The expression between the square brackets on the second line represents the sum 
of all types of income by the type ( ,i s  ) of agent. The first term in the brackets 
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indicates the sum of wages and industrial accident compensation and the second term 
represents unemployment benefits. In the last term, 
, , , ,i s i s i s i s
b hc pen     
represents the agent’s income, determined to be unrelated to the agent’s productivity, 
such as welfare expenditures, health insurance, and national pension benefits. R  is 
a time-invariant gross interest rate and 
,i s
   represents the unconditional 
probability of survival for each type.  




ub , and 
,i s
  grow at 
the same rate z , consumption also increases precisely at the same rate every period. 
Thus, per-capita consumption by type can be expressed by the following formula. 
 
, , , , 1
(1 )
i s t i s t
c z c

   
 
E. Equilibrium Condition 
 
As shown thus far, this model has a simplified structure in which the wage rate is 
determined exogenously and consumption is determined by the consumption 
function of the households instead of explicitly considering the optimization problem 
of the households. Therefore, the wage rate and parameters of the consumption 
function must be given from outside the model. The only equilibrium condition in 
this model, therefore, is the inter-temporal government budget constraint (IGBC, 
henceforth). The IGBC means that the government’s initial debt size must equal the 
sum of the present value of the future primary fiscal balance so that the government’s 
debt satisfies the ‘No Ponzi Game Condition’. If this equation is not satisfied, it 
means that the government debt level is not sustainable given the current tax revenue 
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      
Here, 
0
D  represents government debt in the initial period, 
t
REV  is the total tax 
revenue at time t , 
t
G  denotes government consumption at t , 
t
HC  is the total 
health insurance benefit, and 
t
PEN  is the national pension benefit. Therefore, 
(
t t t t t




Most of the parameters are sourced from data outside of the model, and only a few 
parameters are determined inside the model by the fiscal equilibrium condition 
(IGBC). This section describes the calibration method used for the key parameters 
and distribution. Basically, most of the parametrization steps are conducted to match 
the initial economy ( 0t  ) of the model to the actual figures for 2015. 
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A. Demographic Structure and Dynamics 
 
Fertility and Mortality Rates 
 
Fertility and mortality rates are assumed to remain at the 2015 level for all periods 
in this analysis. The fertility rate of native women by age is calculated using data 
from the ‘Vital Statistics’ and ‘Population Census’ databases of Statistics Korea. 
Regarding the fertility rate of foreign women in Korea, however, there is not much 
reliable data. For example, if the mother of a newborn child born in 2015 is a 
foreigner, one can find the mother’s age and nationality but cannot find her visa 
status. Thus, it is difficult to estimate the fertility rate by age and visa status. 
Therefore, assumptions must be applied to calibrate fertility by visa type in this 
model. First, it is assumed that non-permanent immigrants (E-9 and H-2 holders) do 
not give birth in the host country at all. Considering they can stay with their visa only 
up to five years, this may not be a strong assumption. Secondly, the fertility of 
marriage migrant visa holders is estimated according to the fertility of female 
immigrants (with all visa types) from selected countries 7  with high ratios of 
marriage migrants. Thirdly, the fertility of those with other types of visas 
(professional staff, overseas Koreans, permanent residence, and others) is assumed 
equal to that of native women. As mentioned above, all newborns are considered to 
be native Koreans regardless of their parents’ nationalities. 
The gender ratio of newborns is fixed at 105:100 assuming that the actual birth 
rate in the “Vital Statistics” database of Statistics Korea in 2015 will be maintained 
in the future. This ratio is assumed to be independent of the mother’s age, labor 
market participation, and visa status. 
The age-mortality rate profile is calculated according to the unconditional 
probability of death for each age using the “Life Tables by Province” data from 
Statistics Korea. It is also assumed that there is no difference between foreigners and 
Koreans in terms of mortality. 
 
TABLE 5— CALIBRATION OF PARAMETERS ON FERTILITY AND MORTALITY 
Parameter Visa Type Method 
Fertility 
Native “Population Census”, 2015 by Statistics Korea 
Marriage Migrant 
Fertility of females from major source countries of marriage migrants. 
Date sources are “Vital Statistics” of Statistics Korea and “Korean 
Immigration Service Statistics” of Ministry of Justice of Korea 
Non-professional 
and Work Visit 
Assume that they do not give birth in Korea 
Immigrants other 
than above 
Assume the identical fertility with the native 
Mortality all 
Unconditional mortality rate is computed using “Life Tables by Province” 
of Statistics Korea. (Mortality rate of immigrants is assumed to be equal 
to that of the native.) 
 
7The selected countries are those with 45% or more marriage migrants (F-6) out of all immigrants and where 
the number of marriage migrants exceeds 100. Those countries are Laos, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In other 
words, the fertility rate of all female immigrants from those three countries is used as a proxy for the fertility of all 
female F-6 holders. The estimated TFR is 2.63, lower than the estimate by Lee et al. (2009). 
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Population Distribution and Immigration Policy 
 
The population of natives by gender and age is constructed using data from the 
“Population Census” of 2015. The distribution of immigrants by gender and age is 
calculated using the 2015 source data entitled “Survey on Immigrant’s Living 
Conditions and Labour Force” by Statistics Korea. 
Regarding the immigration policy – the number of immigrants by visa type, gender, 
and age – it is assumed that the immigration policy of 2015 will be maintained in the 
future. In other words, new migrants in the period after 2015 will have an identical 
distribution in 2015 with regard to visa type, gender, and age. First, using data from 
the “Survey on Immigrant’s Living Conditions and Labour Force” of 2015, the 
number of immigrants who reported that their length of stay is less than a year is 
calculated according to visa type, gender, and age. Then, from 2016, it is assumed 
that the amount and distribution of immigrants that enter each year remain the same. 
The key features of new immigrants in the model economy are shown in Table 6. 
  
TABLE 6— CALIBRATION IMMIGRATION POLICY: ANNUAL NEW ENTRANCES BY VISA TYPE 
Visa Type Number of Entrants Average Age Average Gender Ratio (M : F) 
Non-professional 35,470 27.5 1,180 : 100 
Work Visit 34,138 44.9 207 : 100 
Professional 6,933 28.6 117 : 100 
Marriage Migrant 3,963 32.6 13 : 100 
Overseas Korean 19,780 54.2 123 : 100 
Permanent Residence 564 55.2 68 : 100 
Others 32,554 40.6 96 : 100 




With regard to the non-professional employment (E-9) and work visit (H-2) types, 
it is considered that their upper limits for stays are fixed at four years and ten months 
in both cases. However, instead of granting a ceiling within the model, all E-9 and 
H-2 holders are assumed to return to their home country after living in Korea for 
exactly five years. Regarding the residences of the remaining types of visas, it is 
assumed that they all remain in Korea for their lifetimes. 
 
B. Economic Activity and Labor Market 
 
The working-age population ranges from 19 to 64 years old, and those in the 
population aged outside this range are assumed to have zero labor productivity. The 
efficiency unit wage rate (
0
W ) of the initial economy is set such that the total annual 
income of the working-age population equals 1,568 trillion won, which equals 
Korea’s growth national income (GNI) of 2015.8 The growth rate of 
t
W  (denoted 
 
8In other words, income from factors other than labor is combined with labor income. Because the amount of 
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by z  in the model) is assumed to be 3% annually, and the gross interest rate ( R ) 
is assumed to be 1.04, i.e., net interest rate of 4% per year. 
The implications of parametrizing z   and R   are as follows. In a general 
dynamic macro-model, let the discount factor of the utility function be denoted by 
1  . Then, the Euler equation in the steady state becomes 1R z   . Putting 
1.04R   and 0.03z   into the equation,   is calculated and found to be 0.99. 
In other words, setting a growth rate of 3% and an interest rate of 4% is equivalent 
to setting the discount factor of the utility at 0.99  .9 
Productivity by type, denoted by 
,i s
e , is estimated as follows. First, the gender 
and age-specific wages of native workers are calculated using supplementary survey 
data from the “Economically Active Population Survey.” (Statistics Korea, 2015) 
For immigrants, it is assumed that the relative wage distribution by age and gender 
is identical to that of Koreans for each visa type, but weights are applied so that there 
is a gap in the scale. Weights are computed using data for average monthly salary by 
visa type from the “Survey on Immigrant’s Living Conditions and Labour Force.” 
The wage weights by visa type are listed in Table 8. 
The ratio of the labor force to the non-labor force in the population by age, gender, 
and visa type in the initial economy is set using data from the “Economically Active 
Population Survey” and the “Survey on Immigrant’s Living Conditions and Labour 
Force” for natives and immigrants, respectively. As mentioned above, when an agent 
becomes 19 years old, it is determined whether she is economically active or not, 
 
TABLE 7— CALIBRATION ON WAGE 
Parameter Meaning Value Note 
 Efficiency Unit Wage Rate 81.8 Million Won Targeting GDI to be 1,568 Trillion Won 
 Annual Growth Rate of Wage 3% Author’s choice 
 Annual Gross Interest Rate 1.04 Author’s choice 
 
TABLE 8— MONTHLY SALARY AND WEIGHTS RELATIVE TO THE NATIVE 
Visa Type Average Monthly Salary (Won) Weight (Native = 1) 
Non-Professional 1,959,792 0.85 
Work Visit 1,851,284 0.81 
Professional 2,451,326 1.07 
Marriage Migrant 1,704,489 0.74 
Permanent Resident 1,918,138 0.84 
Overseas Korean 2,000,462 0.87 
Other 2,245,608 0.98 
Note: The average monthly salary of the native is 2.297 million won, and the weight is the proportion to 2.297. Note 
that the monthly salary is used only for computing weights, so these monthly salaries are not necessarily equal to 
those in the model economy. 
Source: Calculated using Statistics Korea, “Survey on Immigrant’s Living Conditions and Labour Force.” 
 
government expenditures is adapted to the national accounts of Korea, it is natural for the size of the income to also 
be adjusted to the total GDI in order for budget-balancing to be feasible. 
9The solution of the model is very robust to changes of  and  as long as the discount factor is fixed at 0.99. 
For instance, even if a lower growth path is assumed in which  = 0.01 and  = 1.02, the solution deviates only 
negligibly. 
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TABLE 9— CALIBRATION OF LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY VISA TYPE 
Visa Type 
LFPR Unemployment Rate 
Male Female Male Female 
Foreigners 
Non-professional (E-9) 99.8% 99.9% 0.0% 1.1% 
Work Visit (H-2) 92.7% 77.5% 4.4% 7.3% 
Professional (E-1~E-7) 99.8% 98.4% 0.6% 0.0% 
Marriage Migrant (F-2-1, F-6) 82.9% 45.9% 6.8% 5.4% 
Overseas Korean (F-4) 79.7% 50.1% 8.9% 5.7% 
Permanent Residence (F-5) 89.2% 67.4% 4.6% 3.8% 
Others 63.0% 27.8% 8.9% 20.7% 
Natives 84.6% 61.8% 3.7% 3.6% 
Source: Calculated using Statistics Korea, “Economically Active Population Survey” and “Survey on Immigrant’s 
Living Conditions and Labour Force,” 2015. 
 
and this setting does not change for her lifetime in the model economy. The 
probability of participating in the labor market for each gender and for both natives 
and immigrants is calibrated so that it equals the labor force participation rate of 
2015 of each group. The unemployment rate for each group is also set by referring 
to the same source. Table 9 presents the average labor force participation rate and 
the unemployment rate by visa status in the model.  
It is not easy to find appropriate data for measuring the propensity to consume. 
Thus, propensity to consume is estimated as follows using household consumption 
expenditure data by age group in the “Household Income and Expenditure Survey” 
as substitute data.10 First, using 2015 data, the average consumption expenditure 
according to the householder’s age is summed up horizontally, and the sum is 
assumed to be the average lifetime income. Then, using this outcome, the proportion 
of consumption for each age is computed and used as a proxy for 
,i s
  for each ( ,i s ). 
It is assumed that there are no differences in consumption propensity by gender, but 
the propensity to consume of immigrants is assumed to be lower than that of natives 
considering the fact that a considerable amount of immigrants’ income is known to 
be remitted to their home countries. Specifically, the propensity to consume for non-
professional employment (E-9) and work visitors (H-2), residence for whom is 
limited to five years, is assumed to be 20.2% of that of natives of the same age. For 
marriage migrants, their propensity to consume is set equal to that of natives, 
assuming that they tend to assimilate into the host country. For the other visa types 
(professional staff, overseas Koreans, permanent residents, and others), their 
propensity to consume is set to 65.5% of that of age-matched natives.11 
  
 
10 “Household Income and Expenditure Survey” (Statistics Korea, 2015) includes a variable denoted by 
“average propensity to consume,” but this is different from the propensity to consume defined in the model of this 
paper. The average propensity to consume in that survey indicates what proportion of the disposable income of the 
corresponding age group is used for the consumption expenditure by each period, while propensity to consume in 
this article refers to the percentage of lifetime income spent at each age. 
11The ratio of deductions by visa type is sourced from Jung et al. (2012; 2013). 
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C. Government 
 
Government Consumption and Transfers12 
 
Government consumption and transfer expenditures (
,i s
g , 
,i sb , ,i sub , ,i sia ) are 
distributed with regard to each age group, gender, and visa type according to Korean 
government’s settlement of the fiscal year 2015 (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
2016). First, the items in the statement are divided into transfers and non-transfers. 
Then the amount of non-transfers is categorized as government consumption. If 
some items in transfers and non-transfers are explicitly intended for a specific age or 
gender group (e.g., expenditures for elementary schools), then such amounts are 




The benefit for natives by age and gender in 2015 is set based on the “National 
Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook.” Data for immigrants’ benefits by age, gender, 
and visa type could not be obtained, but the ratio of medical expenses per capita for 
natives and foreigners is available (see Figure 2). Thus, for foreigners, the 
distribution of the benefit for each age and gender is assumed to be identical to that 
of natives, and the scale of all types of foreigners’ benefits is adjusted so that the 
native-foreign share of the total salary is equal to that in the 2015 data. It is also 
assumed that there are no differences among immigrants according to the type of 
visa. 
 
(Unit: Korean won) 
 
FIGURE 2. AVERAGE MONTHLY MEDICAL EXPENSES FOR THE NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS 
Source: Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service and National Health Insurance Service (2016). 
 
 
12It is very likely that there are major differences between natives and immigrants in terms of benefits from the 
government. In this study, the types of benefits for which such differences can be identified, fully or partially, are 
considered. For instance, it is considered that the health insurance benefit to foreigners tends to be smaller than that 
given to natives of the same ages and gender. However, there are still many types of benefits for which such 
differences cannot be identified with existing data. 
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National Pension 
 
With regard to the national pension, only the old-age pension and lump-sum 
refunds for non-professional employment and work visitors are taken into 
consideration, while other parts of the national pension (e.g., disability pension, 
survivor’s pension, and lump-sum for death) are disregarded for simplicity. 
To calibrate the pension benefit, a simplified formula is used instead of the actual 
method for convenience of the analysis, reflecting the current salary formula of the 
national pension system considering the past income of the recipient and economic 
income as a policy variable. First, regarding the old-age pension, the simplified 
formula reflects the pension system of Korea, which is a mixture of the average 
income of all beneficiaries (hereinafter, the  value) and the income of individual 
recipients (hereinafter, the   value). The formula is set such that the income 
replacement rate is fixed at 20% over all model periods.13 
In addition, it is assumed that the maximum benefit rate can be applied to all 
beneficiaries regardless of the period of subscription to the national pension. Also, it 
is assumed that benefit payments are made exactly at the age of 65 in all cases.14 
Specifically, the annual benefit of retirees of type ( ,i s ) in the initial period of the 




i s i s
pen A B    
Here, A  represents the annual average wage of all beneficiaries and B  is the 
present value of the annual average wage earned by a retiree of type ( ,i s ) before 
retiring. For instance, if the present value of a beneficiary’s past average wage for a 
type ( ,i s ) happens to be identical to the overall average, the pension benefit will be 
exactly 20% of her past income. 
Regarding lump-sum refunds, the National Pension Act of Korea indicates that (1) 
if the foreigner’s home country’s law gives Korean citizens a corresponding salary 
equivalent to the lump-sum refund, or (2) if a social security agreement on lump-
sum refunds is active, or (3) if the foreigner holds an E-8, E-2, or H-2 visa, then she 
will receive the principal and interest of her national pension payment during her 
stay as refunds when she leaves Korea. Based on this, our model also assumes that 
non-professional employees and work visitors receive lump-sum refunds of their 
pension payments when they leave the host country after a five-year stay. 15 
However, because the labor income tax rate and the pension payment rate are not 
 
13The income replacement rate, which is derived through a proportional constant in the original national pension 
formula, is 46.5% as of 2015, and is designed to reach 40% in 2028 by decreasing by 0.5%p every year. However, 
this is the nominal replacement rate assuming 40 years of entitlement in the national pension. In reality, Korea’s 
national pension is not sufficiently mature, and it is practically impossible to join the national pension for 40 years 
due to retirement or other reasons. Therefore, the actual replacement rate is estimated to be around 20% in the 
literature. For example, the actual replacement rates of national pensions are estimated at 16.9%, 18.56%, and 
23.98% in Shin (2015), Kim and Kwon (2016), and Woo et al. (2016), respectively. In the model used here, a defined 
benefit type of formula is assumed in that a real replacement rate of 20% is guaranteed. 
14In reality, the rate of the benefit varies depending on the duration of entitlement, and the age of receipt is also 
set to a period of 60 to 65 years old instead of setting it at a certain age. 
15In reality, Korean citizens can receive a lump-sum refund due to reasons such as an insufficient entitlement 
period. In the model, however, all beneficiaries except non-professional employees and work visitors are assumed 
not to select this option but to receive pension benefits only in the form of old-age pensions. 
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differentiated in this model, the exact amount of the lump-sum refund should be set 
arbitrarily outside the model. In the model, it is assumed that the foreign worker 
receives a value equal to the annual income (equivalent to the B value of the national 
pension benefit formula) multiplied by the average income replacement rate of the 






Government Debt and Taxation 
 
This study assumes a hypothetical government account that combines the 
government’s general accounts with major funds (National Pension Fund, WCI, and 
Employment Insurance Fund).17 Thus, the government debt in the model is the 
government debt in the actual general account minus the sum of the national pension 
fund, the WCI fund (industrial accident insurance fund), and the employment 
insurance fund. As of the end of 2014, the government debt is approximately 527.1 
trillion won, the national pension fund is 469.8 trillion won, the employment 
insurance fund is 7.6 trillion won, and the WCI fund is 10.2 trillion won. Therefore, 
the government debt of the initial period in the model economy is approximately 
39.5 trillion won.18 
The tax system of this model consists of the average income tax rate (
l
 ) and 
average consumption tax rate (
c
 ). Although 
l
  is expressed such that it refers to 
the tax rate on labor income, it is actually different from the actual labor income tax 
rate in reality. In this model, taxes on capital income, such as corporate taxes and 
employers’ contributions to social insurance, are not explicitly considered. 
Therefore, the term “income tax rate” is used throughout this article instead of the 
term “labor income tax rate.” Therefore, it is more reasonable for the income tax rate 
here to be interpreted as a concept covering taxes on both labor and capital income 
and the contributions to various social security schemes. 
Indeed, the average effective tax rate calculated by the method of Mendoza et al. 
(1994) using the national accounts and tax revenue data for 2015 for Korea is 25% 
for the labor income tax and 11% for the consumption tax. However, as mentioned 
above, 
l
  in this model is different from the labor income tax rate conceptually, and 
this combination does not satisfy the above-mentioned government IGBC condition 
(Equation (1)), and given that 0.25
l
   and 0.11
c
  , Korea’s current debt level 
is not sustainable in the model economy. Therefore, the IGBC conditions should be 
adjusted by changing the consumption tax rate and income tax rate. In this paper, the 
consumption tax rate is fixed at 11% and the income tax rate is adjusted for balancing 
 
16The payment rate for individual employees into the national pension is 4.5%, and the non-professionals and 
work visitors in the model stay in Korea for five years. By simple algebra, the lump sum is 22.5% of the annual 
income. Considering there are blind spots in the pension system, 20% is assumed to be a figure which measures 
immigrants’ fiscal contributions quite conservatively. 
17Regarding other funds such as the private school pension fund, they are considered to be relatively unrelated 
to immigration policy, even if the amounts are large. Thus, they are not included in the government account in this 
study. 
18In this model, the sum of future primary balance changes very sensitively to changes in the income tax rate. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the initial debt is 39.5 trillion won or 527.1 trillion won, the difference in the 
equilibrium tax rate is less than 0.2%p, meaning that the model is very robust to the level of initial debt. 
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the budget constraint.19 The income tax rate induced by this equilibrium condition 
is calculated and found to be approximately 39.3%.20 
 
V. Results of Equilibrium Analysis 
  
A. Definition of Fiscal Contribution and Its NPV 
 
When consumption, hours worked, and government taxation and fiscal 
expenditures are realized in equilibrium, the contribution of each type of agent to the 
government’s fiscal soundness can be calculated. The fiscal contribution of type 
( ,i s ) in the initial period of the economy ( 0t  ) is denoted as 
, ,0i s
fc  and is defined 
as follows:  
 
, ,0 , ,0 0 , , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
(1 )
(1 )
i s c i s l i s i s i s i s
i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s
fc c W e u g b
hc ia e u ub e u pen
        
    
 
In other words, the fiscal contributions of agents of type ( ,i s ) correspond to taxes 
levied on these agents minus government expenditures caused by or paid to them 
(government consumption, transfers, health insurance benefits, WCI benefits, 
unemployment benefits, and pension benefits). If this value is positive, the agents 
are considered to contribute to the government’s finances in this period, whereas if 
it is negative, the fiscal burden is then greater than the contribution of the agents to 
the fiscal status of the government. 
However, the fiscal contribution calculated in this way is only a measure of the 
fiscal contribution of an agent at a particular point in time. An agent will not have 
the same fiscal impact in the future. For example, if a 60-year-old immigrant enters 
the country and has a job, the fiscal contribution may be positive at the moment, but 
if she retires in only a few years and becomes old, the contribution will be negative 
thereafter. Therefore, it is necessary to sum them over time for more reasonable 
analyses. For this purpose, the NPV (net present value) of the fiscal contribution of 
the type ( ,i s ) is calculated. In other words, we sum up the present value of the future 
fiscal contribution of each type of agent over time in order to evaluate the agents’ 
lifetime contributions as of a period. Technically, the NPV is calculated by initially 
computing the NPV of a newborn (0 years old) and then calculating the NPV of the 
remaining agents using the newborn’s NPV. The detailed procedure is shown below. 
Let the NPV of type ( ,i s ) at 0t   be denoted by 
,i s
npv . As described above, 
the type element s  consists of gender, labor market participation, visa type, and 
age at the time of immigration. Let m  and f  be subsets of s , let m  be all types 
 
19Alternatively, the balance can be met by fixing the tax rates and adjusting government spending or pension 
schemes. 
20This tax rate may appear to be excessively high considering that the effective payroll tax rate in Korea is 
usually estimated to be less than 20%. However, note that  in this study does not imply a labor income tax rate 
but a (consolidated) income tax rate, including not only labor income but also capital income. Considering this, the 
gap between the actual rate and the model rate becomes significantly smaller. 
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of males, and let f  be females. Then, 
0,mnpv  and 0, fnpv  , NPV of male and 
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  represents the corrected birth rate of type ( ,i s ),21 and 
, ,i s t
fc  is the 
fiscal contribution of type ( ,i s ) at time t . In the equations, 
,i m  and ,i f , the 
unconditional probability of survival at age i  for each gender, are used because the 
unconditional and conditional probabilities are equal for a newborn child. 
The implications of equation (2) are as follows. First, when a child is born, he or 
she will contribute as much as 
, ,i m i
fc  every year during their life. Accordingly, the 
present value of this part is taken into account. Secondly, the second term of the 
square bracketed term considers the value of the children that this newborn may have 
in the future. He or she contributes to birth with probability 
,i s
  at the age i , and 
the child born is a boy with a probability of 105/205 and a girl with probability of 
100/205, as mentioned in the previous section on calibration. Because there are two 
equations with two unknowns, the NPV for newborns of both genders can be solved. 
After calculating the NPV of the newborn, the NPVs of the remaining agents can 
be calculated using the fact that all newborn children are considered to be natives 
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B. Results of Analysis 
 
Fiscal Contribution by Type 
 
Before looking at the NPV, the distribution of the fiscal contributions by age for 
each type of agent as of 2015 (
, ,0i s
fc ) is demonstrated. First, Figure 3 compares the 
average fiscal contribution of foreigners with Korean natives by age. The vertical  
 
21Here, the fertility rate is corrected such that we apply only half of fertile women in the actual data to the 
women’s contribution, with the other half applied as the males’ contribution. In other words, this is similar to 
assuming that all children are born only between couples consisting of a male and a female. We also apply half of 
the female births to males who are two years older instead of males of the same age, considering the average ages 
of a husband and wife in Korea. This approach is different from that of Storesletten (2003), in which all NPVs 
through birth are assumed to be exclusively the females’ contribution. 
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FIGURE 3. PER-CAPITA FISCAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE NATIVE AND IMMIGRANTS 
 
axis in the figure indicates the average per-capita fiscal corresponding to each age. 
For example, a 0-year-old Korean native is estimated to have a fiscal contribution of 
about -9.6 million won, while a 40-year-old Korean native is estimated to make a 
fiscal contribution of about 16.9 million won. In other words, the average 
contribution of the per-capita income tax and consumption tax for a 40-year-old 
Korean native is greater than the government’s financial burden per capita by about 
16.9 million won. 
In the range of working age (19-64 in the model), both natives and immigrants 
show positive (+) fiscal contributions, indicating that the tax revenues from these 
groups in that age range exceed the government’s financial burden. Because the 
productivity of natives is assumed to be higher than that of foreigners on average, 
native Koreans make higher fiscal contributions than foreigners during their working 
years. On the other hand, for those aged 60 or older, this relationship is reversed, and 
the natives cause more of a financial burden. This occurs because natives have higher 
incomes during their working years than immigrants. Because natives have made 
more pension and health insurance contributions than immigrants, they are paid more 
after their retirement and exhibit smaller fiscal contributions than immigrants. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the breakdown of the fiscal contribution of foreigners 
by visa type. First, Figure 4 compares the per-capita fiscal contributions of 
professional staff (E-1~E-7) and overseas Koreans (F-4) to that of Koreans. For 
professional staff, they exhibit higher productivity and labor force participation rates 
than those of the natives on average. Therefore, their fiscal contribution in the 
working-age group is approximately 1.5~2 times higher than that of the natives. On 
the other hand, for overseas Koreans, the average fiscal contribution of the working-
age group is slightly smaller than that of the natives given that their average wage is 
lower than that of the natives. 
Next, Figure 5 shows the fiscal contributions of marriage migrants (F-2-1, F-6), 
permanent residents (F-5), and others. Permanent residents make similar fiscal 
contributions to natives, while marriage migrants and others make lower fiscal 
contributions than natives. For marriage migrants, they have the lowest productivity 
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FIGURE 4. FISCAL CONTRIBUTION BY VISA TYPE – THE PROFESSIONAL AND OVERSEAS KOREANS 
 
 
FIGURE 5. FISCAL CONTRIBUTION BY VISA TYPE – 
MARRIAGE MIGRANT, PERMANENT RESIDENCE, AND OTHER 
 
among the visa types considered in this study; hence, their contributions by paying 
taxes and social security are smaller than those of the natives. For the other visa 
types, although their average productivity is higher than that of marriage migrants, 
they exhibit the lowest labor force participation rate among all visa types. Thus, the 
average fiscal contribution for their working-age group is relatively low. 
Lastly, we examine the fiscal contributions of non-professionals (E-9) and work 
visitors (H-2), who are assumed to stay for five years and then leave. In this case, 
the period of stay affects the fiscal contribution due to the lump sum return of the 
pension, and other factors. Figure 6 compares the per-capita fiscal contributions of 
the first-year non-professionals and work visitors to those of the natives. As shown 
in the figure, non-professionals show higher fiscal contributions than average 
natives, but this amount is slightly lower than that by native employees due to the  
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FIGURE 6. FISCAL CONTRIBUTION BY VISA TYPE – THE NON-PROFESSIONAL AND WORK VISIT 
  
wage gap. Regarding work visitors, despite their high labor force participation rate, 
they show lower fiscal contributions than even the average natives. 
 
NPV of the Future Fiscal Contribution 
 
As mentioned earlier, the fiscal contribution (
, ,i s t
fc ) is a measure of how much an 
agent of a particular type contributes to the government’s fiscal soundness for a 
certain period, but this alone cannot be a measure of the fiscal contribution of an 
agent. Even if an immigrant makes a positive fiscal contribution for a certain period, 
it should also be considered how much of a fiscal burden will arise if he/she lives in 
the host country past their retirement. Moreover, if a birth occurs in the host country, 
the fiscal contribution made by the immigrants’ descendants should also be 
considered. In order to determine the long-term effects of immigrants on public 
finances, the NPV of the fiscal effects must be included in the analysis for not only 
the instantaneous effects but also for the long-term effects.  
Figure 7 illustrates the result after computing the average NPV of the natives by 
age. The average per-capita NPV for a newborn is estimated to be about 161.6 
million won, which is a positive number.22 This means that the fiscal contribution 
(taxes and social security payments) that a child newly born in 2015 is expected to 
make on average is expected to be larger than the fiscal burden caused by him/her 
by 161.6 million won (according to the 2015 value). For the average Korean, it is 
estimated that the NPV is positive until the age of 42. After 43, the present value of 
the tax burden to be paid by the economic entity catches up to the government 
spending caused by him/her. 
 
22For reference, Storesletten (2003) conducted a similar study on Sweden and found that the NPV of a Swedish 
native newborn is around -46,000 kroner (about -6 million Korean won). If the NPV of a newborn is negative, one 
may doubt whether such an economy can be fiscally sustained. However, it is theoretically possible, as the NPV of 
Swedes of working age is positive given that the net fiscal gain of the working-age population in the initial period 
can compensate for the net fiscal burden of the newborns in the future. 
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FIGURE 7. NPV FOR THE NATIVE 
 
 
FIGURE 8. NPV FOR THE NATIVE VS. IMMIGRANTS 
 
Figure 8 compares the NPV of average Korean to that of the average immigrant 
by age. When only considering immigrants with visas excluding non-professional 
employment (E-9) and work visit (H-2) types,23 the NPV of the native becomes 
negative from the age of 43, while that of the average immigrant (excluding those 
holding E-9 and H-2 visas) becomes negative from the age of 42. The NPV of 
Koreans tends to be slightly larger than that of immigrants in the range where the 
NPV is positive. In order for the comparison to be more visible, the average NPV of 
a 0-year-old immigrant is compared with the NPV of a newborn, although 
immigration at 0 years old is not very realistic. The NPV of a 0-year-old immigrant  
 
23Because E-9 and H-2 visa holders generally do not migrate to Korea outside of their working ages, the age-
specific NPV of all immigrants cannot be computed. Therefore, the average NPV for all immigrants is only 
computable for the working ages (19~64). 
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FIGURE 9. NPV OF THE NON-PROFESSIONAL AND WORK VISIT 
 
is only 60.2 million won, which is lower than that of a 0-year-old Korean newborn, 
as the average productivity and the labor force participation rate of the immigrants 
are both smaller than those of natives during their working years. Considering the 
overall immigrants’ average including E-9 and H-2 types, the average NPV of 
immigrants up to their 40s is lower but the transition from positive to negative is 
delayed because non-professionals and work visitors are short-term workers leaving 
Korea before their retirement. Because they mostly conduct economic activities and 
leave Korea before retirement, their NPVs are always positive. 
Figure 9 demonstrates this more clearly. It compares the age-specific NPV of 
Koreans to those of non-professionals and work visitors directly. For native Koreans, 
the NPV up to their mid-30s is much higher than those of non- professionals and 
work visitors. However, as the age increases, the NPV of native Koreans declines 
sharply, while the NPVs of non-professionals and work visitors exhibit a stable path 
over time. 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the NPVs of immigrants holding the remaining visa 
types. The immigrants with professional staff visas (E-1~E-7) during their working 
years exhibit high NPVs nearly twice as high as that of natives, and the value remains 
positive up to the age of 46 due to their high productivity and labor force 
participation rates. Meanwhile, the NPV of permanent residents (F-5) is similar to 
that of native Koreans. Overseas Koreans (F-4), marriage migrants (F-2-1, F-6), and 
others show lower NPVs than that of native Koreans. 
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FIGURE 10. NPV OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND OVERSEAS KOREAN 
  
 
FIGURE 11. NPV OF MARRIAGE MIGRANTS, PERMANENT RESIDENCE, AND OTHERS 
 
NPV of Fiscal Contribution and Its Policy Implications 
 
As shown above, the fiscal contribution and its NPV varies by age and visa 
type given that productivity and labor market participation rates vary. Table 10 
summarizes the ranges of ages in which the NPV is estimated to be positive by visa 
type. The non-professionals and work visitors exhibit positive NPVs during their 
stay due to their characteristics as short-term workers, while the remaining types 
exhibit different ranges according to the productivity, labor market participation, and 
unemployment rates. 
First, for the non-professionals and work visitors, the NPV is positive for all ages 
between 19 and 64. Because they are a short-term cyclical workforce, they generally 
leave the country before they retire and gain a benefit from the host country’s welfare 
54 KDI Journal of Economic Policy NOVEMBER 2020 
TABLE 10— RANGE OF AGES WITH POSITIVE NPVS BY VISA TYPE 
Visa Type 
Range of Ages with Positive NPV 
Largest NPV (Corresponding Age) 
From To 
Non-professional 19 60 93.12 million won (34) 
Work Visit 19 60 68.73 million won (35) 
Professional 0 46 625.99 million won (19) 
Marriage Migrant 1 36 170.70 million won (19) 
Overseas Korean 4 38 164.31 million won (24) 
Permanent Resident 0 41 280.73 million won (24) 
Other 11 35 93.50 million won (24) 
Native 0 41 236.13 million won (21) 
Note: For the non-professional and work visitors, only immigrants of ages 19~60 are considered. In other words, 
this table implies that all ages of the non-professional and work visitors exhibit positive NPVs. 
 
state, while they pay taxes and fees during working in Korea due to their high 
participation and employment rates. 
For those holding the remaining types of visas, no immigrants over 50 have 
positive NPVs for any type, and in particular, marriage migrants, overseas Koreans, 
and the other types start to have negative NPVs from their the mid- to late 30s. There 
are also differences in the starting ages of positive NPVs by visa type. For 
professional staff and permanent residents, immigrants of age 0 have a positive 
value, while the starting ages are 1 to 11 for the remaining visa types. This pattern 
has implications similar to those of the results of Storesletten (2000), in which only 
mid- and high-skilled immigrants aged 20 to 50 years have positive NPVs, and 
Storesletten (2003), which showed positive NPVs from average immigrants aged 20 
to 30, while the range is slightly wider in this study than in those. Immigrants who 
are young and have a high degree of skill are estimated to make a high fiscal 
contribution, but if immigrants are excessively old or young, they show a net fiscal 
burden. 
Next, using the estimated NPV by age and visa type, the total NPV of the actual 
immigrants in Korea as of 2015 is calculated. The total NPV for each visa type is 
computed by multiplying the number of immigrants of each type by the 
corresponding NPV and then summing up these values for each visa type. Table 11 
displays the results. As indicated in the table, the total NPV of the total population  
 
TABLE 11— SUM OF NPVS FOR EACH VISA TYPE USING ACTUAL NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS (2015) 
Visa Type Number of Immigrants Sum of NPVs (Trillion Won) 
Non-professional 264,584 11.1 
Work Visit 287,831 6.4 
Professional 46,981 17.6 
Marriage Migrant 124,301 -16.3 
Overseas Korean 300,931 -22.9 
Permanent Resident 111,387 -5.7 
Other 141,005 -5.4 
All Immigrants 1,277,020 -15.1 
Natives 49,710,452 994.4 
Sum 50,987,473 979.3 
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of Korea, including both natives and immigrants, is estimated to be approximately 
979.3 trillion won as of 2015. The net fiscal contribution of native Koreans is 994.4 
trillion won, and the sum of the net contribution of foreigners is -15.1 trillion won, 
implying that the present value of future fiscal contribution of an average immigrant 
into Korea is negative. 
By visa type, the NPVs of non-professionals and work visitors are estimated to be 
11.1 trillion won and 6.4 trillion won, respectively, implying that they are net 
contributors to Korea’s fiscal soundness. For professional staff members, their 
average NPV per capita is 2~3 times higher than that of natives, but their total 
population size is small and the total NPV is only 17.6 trillion won. For all other visa 
types, the sum of the NPVs is negative. For marriage migrants, overseas Koreans, 
permanent residents, and others, their average NPV per capita tends to be positive 
before their mid-30s. However, their total NPV is calculated as a negative number 
because their ages tend to be high and their labor participation rates low. 
This result suggests that the current immigration policy of Korea has not achieved 
positive effects at least fiscally. In fact, immigrants who can contribute to Korea’s 
finances are those who are younger than their mid-30s and participate in the labor 
market, whereas immigrants who actually stay in Korea tend to incur net fiscal costs 
due to their high ages or low economic participation rates. More importantly, the fact 
that the sum of all immigrants’ NPVs is negative indicates that an immigration policy 
that only increases the number of immigrants while maintaining the current 
population structure may result in a worsening of Korea’s fiscal situation. 
In conclusion, in order for the future immigration policy to have a positive effect 
on the fiscal side, it is necessary to make an effort to change the current immigration 
influx population structure. In order to predict the mitigation of fiscal problems by 
an influx of immigrants, it is necessary to adopt a selective immigration policy that 
considers immigrants’ productivity rates, ages, and durations of stay. The 
immigration policy must concentrate on allowing in those in their 30s or younger, 
and visas need to be issued more generously for foreigners with professional 
capabilities and high productivity. Also, regarding low-productivity foreigners, 
efforts should be made to avoid fiscal losses by maintaining the principle of short-
term recruitment. These results and policy implications are in line with existing 
studies on immigration in other economies, such as the United States and Europe. 
Instead of an immigration policy only for rebalancing the numerical demographic 
structure due to aging, it is important to focus on the qualitative factors of potential 
immigrants, such as their productivity rates, ages, and willingness to participate in 
the economy. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
  
In this article, the present situation and characteristics of immigrants staying in 
Korea based on various types of available data are studied and the fiscal 
contributions according to different visa types, ages, and economic statuses are 
estimated. Through this model analysis, the desirable direction of future immigration 
policy is sought in a fiscal sense. 
According to the estimation of the fiscal contributions of immigrants by age and 
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visa type, it is confirmed that there are significant differences in the fiscal 
contributions of immigrants according to their visa type and age. For instance, 
professional staff members are estimated to make significantly higher fiscal 
contributions over a wider age range than that of native Koreans. On the other hand, 
marriage migrants and overseas Koreans make lower fiscal contributions than native 
Koreans, and except for certain age groups, such as those in their 20s, they cause 
more of a fiscal burden relative to their contribution. This implies that a selective 
immigration policy that considers the qualitative aspects of potential immigrants is 
more desired than simply considering the age structure of immigrants for the purpose 
of mitigating population aging. 
The implications and limitations of this study are as follows. First, this study is 
meaningful in that the fiscal contributions of immigrants entering Korea are 
estimated using a quantitative model that reflects the actual fiscal system and visa 
issuance system in Korea. Most existing studies of immigration tend to focus on the 
labor market effects or on socialization, and not many in Korea deal with 
immigration in light of the government’s fiscal aspects. However, there are many 
aspects that do not reflect reality due to limitations of data or for technical reasons. 
For example, this model assumes a very restrictive form of return migration only for 
non-professionals and work visitors and does not reflect the fact that many 
immigrants with all visa types return to their home countries in reality. In addition, 
government taxation and social security fees are reflected in the model only in a 
simplified form due to the lack of data for realistically estimating the income 
distribution of immigrants. Finally, this model assumes only a single government 
account, while there are the general account, special accounts, and funds of the 
central government, as well as a number of local government accounts. By 
simplifying this, the effects of immigration on each account, such as the national 
pension fund, cannot be analyzed. These limitations are mainly due to the lack of 
data regarding the economic activities of foreigners, such as the distribution of 
income by visa type, their consumption expenditures, and other factors. Other 
limitations omitted here are expected to be considered in future studies. 
Finally, this study does not intend to claim that immigration policies should be 
determined solely by the size of the fiscal contributions made by immigrants. When 
actually setting immigration policy, various factors, such as human rights issues, 
should be considered in addition to economic aspects. 
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